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Abstract
The nature of concept learning is a core question in cognitive science. The-
ories must account for the relative difficulty of acquiring different concepts
by supervised learners. For a canonical set of six category types, two dis-
tinct orderings of classification difficulty have been found. One ordering,
which we call paradigm-specific, occurs when adult human learners classify
objects with easily distinguishable characteristics such as size, shape, and
shading. The general order occurs in all other known cases: when adult hu-
mans classify objects with characteristics that are not readily distinguished
(e.g., brightness, saturation, hue); for children and monkeys; and when cat-
egorization difficulty is extrapolated from errors in identification learning.
The paradigm-specific order was found to be predictable mathematically by
measuring the logical complexity of tasks, i.e., how concisely the solution can
be represented by logical rules.
However, logical complexity explains only the paradigm-specific order but
not the general order. Here we propose a new difficulty measurement, infor-
mation complexity, that calculates the amount of uncertainty remaining when
a subset of the dimensions are specified. This measurement is based on Shan-
non entropy. We show that, when the metric extracts minimal uncertainties,
this new measurement predicts the paradigm-specific order for the canonical
six category types, and when the metric extracts average uncertainties, this
new measurement predicts the general order. Moreover, for learning cate-
gory types beyond the canonical six, we find that the minimal-uncertainty
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formulation correctly predicts the paradigm-specific order as well or better
than existing metrics (Boolean complexity and GIST) in most cases.
Keywords: Concepts, Induction, Complexity, Learning
1. Introduction
In a canonical classification learning experiment, human learners are
tested on the six possible categorizations that assign eight examples (all pos-
sibilities of three binary-valued dimensions) to two equal-sized classes (Shep-
ard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961). These classification problems, commonly
referred to as the SHJ types, have been instrumental in the development and
evaluation of theories and models of category learning. Learning is easiest
for Type I in which the classes can be distinguished using a simple rule on a
single dimension–e.g. all large items are category A and all small items are
category B. Learning is most difficult for Type V I in which the two classes
cannot be distinguished according to any set of rules or statistical regulari-
ties. The remaining types (II − V ) are intermediate in difficulty. (Table 2
provides a complete description of the six mappings.)
These experiments yield a well-known ordering with a particular pattern
across the intermediate types: Type II (a logical XOR rule on two dimen-
sions) is learned faster than Types III − V , which are learned at the same
speed. An update to this traditional SHJ ordering based on a review of the
existing literature and a series of new experiments reveals that Type II does
not differ from Types III − V except under particular instructional con-
ditions that encourage rule formation or attention to particular dimensions
(Kurtz, Levering, Romero, Stanton, & Morris, 2012).
While this ordering (with or without the recent update) is generally what
researchers associate with the SHJ types, there also exists a set of results
across a wide variety of learning circumstances in which an entirely different
ordering occurs. Specifically, the intermediate types separate into an ordering
as follows: I < IV < III < V < II < V I. Of particular note is the
difficulty in learning Type II (along with the non-equivalence of Types III−
V ). There are four separate cases that yield results consistent with this
ordering: first, stimulus generalization theory, which generates a prediction of
the ordering of the classification problems based on the frequency of mistakes
(pairwise confusions) in learning unique labels (i.e., identification learning)
for each item (Shepard et al., 1961); second, stimuli comprised of integral
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dimensions (Garner, 1974) that are difficult for the learner to perceptually
analyze and distinguish, such as brightness, hue, and saturation (Nosofsky
& Palmeri, 1996); third, learning by monkeys (Smith, Minda, & Washburn,
2004); fourth, learning by children (Minda, Desroches, & Church, 2008).
Since this less well-known ordering occurs across such far-reaching circum-
stances, we will refer to it as the general order ; and since the well-known SHJ
ordering is only found in one specific learning setting (adult humans learn-
ing to classify separable stimuli), we will refer to it as the paradigm-specific
order. We acknowledge that for some readers, it may seem counterintuitive
to dissociate the ordering they are most familiar with from the ordering we
designate as general, but in fact it makes good sense to do so.
To provide further detail about the evidence for the general ordering, it
has been shown that the results for learning the SHJ types with integral-
dimension stimuli fully match the general order, i.e. I < IV < III < V <
II < V I (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1996). Since this also corresponds to stimuli
generalization theory, these results are interpreted as reinforcing Shepard et
al.’s (1961) view that stimuli generalization theory predicts ease of learning
unless a process of attention or abstraction can be applied by the learner.
The settings with non-adult or non-human learners match an important
characteristic of the general order, that II is found to be more difficult than
Types III−V , while there is only some support for the IV < III < V order-
ing. In the cross-species research (Smith et al., 2004), four rhesus monkeys
were tested on a modified version of the SHJ six types. The core finding is
that Type II was more difficult for the monkeys to learn than Types III−V
(which the authors elect to average across in their reporting). In the devel-
opmental work (Minda et al., 2008), the researchers modified the SHJ task
to be age-appropriate for children of ages 3, 5, and 8. Only Types I − IV
were tested: Type II was the most difficult to learn (consistent with the
general rather than the paradigm-specific order). No significant difference
between Types III and IV was observed, however it appears that the re-
searchers did not evaluate the interaction between age of children and their
performance on Types III and IV . From the mean accuracy data, it can
be seen that the children show increasingly good performance on Type III
with age and increasingly poor performance with age on Type IV . While we
do not have access to statistical support, the available evidence is consistent
with the younger children learning Type IV more easily than Type III (as
in the general ordering).
There are two general classes of explanation in the psychological literature
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on category learning that have been successfully applied to the SHJ types.
Mechanistic models, which are implemented in computational simulations
of trial-by-trial learning, have been used to explain the paradigm-specific
order (i.e. Kurtz, 2007; Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004) and some have
been shown to account for both the paradigm-specific and general orders
(Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1996; Pape & Kurtz, 2013). The other
approach is based on the use of formal metrics to measure mathematical
(logical) complexity (Feldman, 2000, 2006; Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman,
& Griffiths, 2008; Goodwin and Johnson-Laird, 2011; Lafond, Lacouture, &
Mineau, 2007; Vigo, 2006, 2009, 2013). These models heretofore account
only for the paradigm-specific order.
We put forth a mathematical complexity metric, information complexity,
which can account for, on one hand, the paradigm-specific order and, on the
other hand, the general order, with a single change in the formula from a min
to a mean operator. Our metric calculates the Shannon entropy (Shannon,
1948) in a classification problem when a subset of the dimensions are spec-
ified. The min operator identifies the subsets of dimensions which provide
the most information (and thus leave the minimal uncertainty): this applies
to the paradigm-specific order, in which sophisticated learners can observe
separable dimensions and may employ abstraction or attention with regard
to these dimensions. On the other hand, the mean operator averages over
subsets of dimensions, and, correspondingly, it applies to the general order,
in which learners are less sophisticated or unable to separate dimensions.
The logic of this correspondence is described in greater detail in Section 2
(Theory). Among complexity accounts of learning behavior, this new mea-
surement has the advantage of being an analytical function exclusively of
observable parameters, i.e. it does not require a heuristic to calculate (Feld-
man, 2000) nor does it require the fitting parameters to data (Vigo, 2013).
In Section 2, we describe the background of information theory and de-
fine the metric. In Section 3, we evaluate the metric’s prediction of learning
behavior. In Section 3.1, we demonstrate the metric’s ability to predict the
paradigm-specific and general orders of the SHJ tasks, as well as show it
successfully predicts quantitative error rates. In Section 3.2, we demonstrate
the metric’s ability to predict the paradigm-specific ordering on classifica-
tion learning tasks beyond SHJ as well or better than the existing metrics
(Boolean complexity and GIST) in all cases but one. We also show it suc-
cessfully predicts the quantitative error rates. The general order setting has
not been tested beyond SHJ: this section also, therefore, provides predictions
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for those future experiments.
2. Theory
In this section, we first provide a comparison of the existing metrics in
the literature, which rely on logical complexity, and Shannon entropy, which
provides the foundation of our metric. Then, we formally introduce our
metric and explain its components.
2.1. Logical Complexity versus Information Complexity
Logical complexity characterizes the length of the shortest description of a
system. In an SHJ-style classification, the ‘system’ in question is a particular
categorization. Feldman’s Boolean complexity (Feldman, 2000) is a type of
logical complexity metric, but there are others, such as Kolmogorov (algo-
rithmic) complexity, which is the length of the shortest program to produce a
certain output (Li & Vitaˆanyi, 2008). These are all related in the sense that
they are attempting to construct a minimal set of logical rules that describe a
system or process or categorization. The measurement of Boolean complex-
ity begins with the ‘disjunctive normal form’ of a classification, which is the
most verbose way to describe the classification as a set of values connected
by AND and OR, i.e. “(small AND dark AND circle) OR (large AND dark
AND circle).” Then heuristics are applied to eliminate redundant elements,
and the metric is defined as the final, minimal number of remaining logical
literals.
Vigo’s GIST (Vigo, 2013) is not strictly a logical-complexity metric, but
also incorporates aspects models based on selective attention, such as GCM,
ALCOVE, and SUSTAIN (Nosofsky, 1986; Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004).
GIST stands for “Generalized Invariance Structure Theory.” The term “in-
variance” refers to distilled elements of a category when a dimension is sup-
pressed or ignored. Objects that appear multiple times under these condi-
tions are considered ‘invariant.’1 The essence of the GIST metric is that the
more invariants, the easier a category is to learn; the fewer invariants, the
harder. Invariants are somewhat similar to the notion of redundant elements
in Boolean complexity.
1An earlier version of this model, CIT (Vigo, 2009), involves perturbing the dimensional
value and considering objects that remain in the category, which is a more natural notion
of ‘invariance.’
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Information complexity characterizes the amount of information or uncer-
tainty in a system. The most commonly used metric, Shannon information
entropy (Shannon, 1948), measures how much information an observer can
gain from one observation of a system: the higher the Shannon entropy, the
more unpredictable. To explain Shannon entropy, we begin with the formal
definition and then consider an example of a fair and unfair coin.
First, the definition of Shannon entropy. Consider a single random vari-
able X, which can take on finitely many values {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where value
xi occurs with probability pi. Then the Shannon entropy of X is given by:
H(X) =
n∑
i=1
pi · I(pi),
where I(p) = − log2 p
In the information theory literature, the function I(p) is called the “self-
information” of an event which occurs with probability p. I(p) can be in-
terpreted as the informativeness of observing such an event, i.e. how much
surprise the event engenders. Taking that interpretation as given, H(X) is
then the probabilistically-weighted sum of the informativeness of all possible
outcomes of X. This means H(X) is the expected value of informativeness
of X.
H(X) can be interpreted as uncertainty. Why? I(p) is the ex-post ‘sur-
prise’ engendered by a single observation of an event, which means that
H(X) is the expected ex-ante ‘surprise.’ That does it mean to expect sur-
prise? Consider the opposite: suppose one expects to not be surprised by
an outcome. When one expects not to be surprised, one can be said to be
fairly certain. Therefore, if one expects to be surprised, one can be said to
be uncertain. Therefore, H(X) can be interpreted as ‘uncertainty.’
To further clarify the interpretation of I(p) = − log2 p as the informative-
ness of an event which occurs with probability p, note that over the range
of valid probabilities, − log2 p goes to ∞ as p approaches 0, it is 1 at p = 12 ,
and it is 0 at p = 1. This reflects the idea that an event that occurs with
vanishingly small probability is very surprising when it occurs, so is very
informative. On the other hand, an event that occurs with certainty (i.e.
with probability 1), is completely uninformative: what happens is what one
is sure would happen.
Our metric is founded on this way of measuring uncertainty. Uncertainty
is maximized when all events are equally probable. Intuitively, this rests
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on symmetry, and the fact that making one event less likely increases the
informativeness of that event, but also necessarily makes the other event more
likely, decreasing the informativeness of that other event. In the extreme, a
certain event has zero informativeness, because the informativeness of the
certain event (= 0) is multiplied by the total available probability of one,
and the other event is ignored. Mathematically, this arises from maximizing
uncertainty with straightforward calculus. For example, in the case of two
events, pI(p) + (1− p)I(1− p) is maximized at p = .5.
Consider the uncertainty of a fair, then unfair coin. Suppose X ′ is
the flip of a fair coin, where the outcomes are “heads” and “tails” and
pheads = ptails = .5. The informativeness of each “heads” or “tails” is
− log2 12 = 1, as mentioned above. Therefore, the information entropy is
H(X ′) = (.5 · 1 + .5 · 1) = 1. This can be interpreted as: a flip of a fair
coin reveals, on average, exactly one binary ‘bit’ of information. On the
other hand, an unfair coin reveals, on average, less than one bit of informa-
tion: Suppose X ′′ is an unfair coin, where “heads” and “tails” occur with
probabilities .75 and .25 respectively. Then
H(X ′′) = .25 · (− log2 .25) + .75 · (− log2 .75)
= (.25 · 2 + .75 · 0.41)
=⇒ H(X ′′) ≈ .81 < 1
This means that it yields, on average, less than one bit of information. In
fact, the more unfair the coin, the less the average flip reveals: the intense
surprise of the unlikely event is smothered by its vanishingly small probabil-
ity. This culminates at the extreme of a maximally unfair coin, X ′′′, whose
‘flips’ are certain and therefore are Shannon entropy-free:
H(X ′′′) = 0 · (− log2 0) + 1 · (− log2 1)
The fact that limp→0 (−p log2 p) = 0 establishes that the first term is zero,
so H(X ′′′) = 0 + 0 = 0.
2.2. The Information Complexity Metric
Our complexity metric is based on Shannon information entropy; as men-
tioned above, it is founded on an aggregation of informativeness. The metric
encodes: If the object’s characteristics for some subset of the dimensions are
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specified, how much uncertainty is left in the categorization? In this way,
we construct an aggregate measure of the informativeness of each dimension
and each set of dimensions.
Formally, let a classification task be formulated as a binary function
f(x) → {A,B}, where A and B are two categories and x is a multidimen-
sional vector with d dimensions, so x = (x1, x2, . . . , xd). Let X be a finite
subset of the real line and is a list of possible values that the entries of x
can take on, so x ∈ Xd. In SHJ, dSHJ = 3, XSHJ = {0, 1}, and there are
six functions f (when symmetric cases are aggregated), one associated with
each Problem Type I − V I.
The information complexity metric rests on calculating the average re-
maining uncertainties in classification after entriess of x are specified to cer-
tain values. It is convenient to define these quantities by grouping them by
the number n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d} of dimensions which are specified. We begin
constructing the metric by considering different ways to partition the stimuli
into subsets when n dimensions are specified.2 We define S(n) as the set of
all such n-dimension partitions. Formally, we define S(n) as:
S(n) =
{ {{
(x1, x2, . . . , xd) | (xi1 , . . . , xin) = (b1, . . . , bn)
} ∣∣∣ {b1, . . . , bn} ∈ Xn}
∣∣∣ {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ {1, . . . , d}}
In SHJ, XSHJ = {0, 1}, and, if we let ? denote an unspecified ‘digit’ of x,
then, for example,
SSHJ (1) =

{(0, ?, ?) , (1, ?, ?)},
{(?, 0, ?) , (?, 1, ?)},
{(?, ?, 0) , (?, ?, 1)}

Note that, as described earlier, each element of SSHJ(1) is a partition of X
d;
for example, the second element represents the set{ {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1)}, {(0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)} }.
2A partition of a set Y is a set of non-overlapping subsets of Y that together contain
every element of Y . I.e. {Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn} is a partition of Y if: Y1 ⊆ Y for all i, Yi∩Yj = ∅
for all i 6= j, and ⋃i Yi = Y .
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As this example demonstrates, this partitions the set of all |X|d = 23 = 8
stimuli into two subsets: one in which the second element is 0 and one in
which the second element is 1.
Now we wish to consider the average remaining uncertainty for each ele-
ment of S(n). We do so by defining a vector U(n), which has a non-negative
real number for each element of S(n). Each element of S(n) is a partition of
the stimulus space, so the entry in U(n) associated with a particular partition
represents the average uncertainty associated with that partition, when one
considers ‘learning’ which subset in that partition one falls in. So USHJ(1)
also has three elements, one for each element of SSHJ (1), and the first entry
of USHJ(1) is the remaining uncertainty after learning, in this case, the first
digit of the stimulus. The values of the entries of U(n) vary with the problem
type determined by function f : i.e. Type I and Type V I classification prob-
lems have different amounts of uncertainties for the same subsets of specified
dimensions. Formally,
U(n) =
{
1
|s|
∑
y∈s
Q(y)
∣∣∣∣∣ s ∈ S(n)
}
,
where Q(y) is defined as
Q(y) =
∑
a∈{A,B}
J
(
p (f(x) = a|x ∈ y) )
with J(p) = p · I(p) = −p log2 p. Q(y) is the function that calculates the
entropy (remaining uncertainty) in classification within y, i.e., when entries
of x in the focal n dimensions are set to a particular set of values; for example,
when the second dimension in SHJ is set to 1. Then each element of U(n)
is a simple average of Q(y) over y, e.g., the average uncertainty when the
second dimension in SHJ is set to 0 or 1.
Then our metric is defined as:
uG(n) = G(U(n)) (1)
where the function G is an aggregation function that produces the amount
of relevant overall uncertainty from U(n). There are two forms of G that are
of interest here, min and mean, which we discuss further in Section 3. As
Equation 1 suggests, we denote the two metrics as umin and umean.
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A B
{0, 0, 0} {0, 1, 0}
{0, 0, 1} {0, 1, 1}
{1, 1, 0} {1, 0, 0}
{1, 1, 1} {1, 0, 1}
Table 1: SHJ Type II
Given this definition, uG(0) represents the average remaining uncertainty
when no dimensions are determined, so S(0) has one element, which is a
set that contains the whole set Xd. uG(0) = 1 if both categories, A and
B, are equally present in the stimulus space. Clearly, uG(0) must equal or
exceed uG(n) for all n > 0. On the other extreme, uG(d) gives the smallest
value because the least unpredictability remains when all dimensions are
determined. In other words, S(d) is a collection of singleton sets, where each
set contains precisely one element of the whole set Xd. In the SHJ series
of experiments, observing all dimensions uniquely defines the category, so
uG(d) = 0. (In principle, one could consider categorization learning in which
the categories have some unresolvable uncertainty, in which case uG(d) > 0.)
For completeness, the statement of the information complexity metric in
a single expression is:
uG(n) = G
({ 1
|Xn|
∑
{b1,...,bn}∈Xn
∑
a∈{A,B}
J
(
p (f(x) = a|(xi1 , . . . , xin) = (b1, . . . , bn))
)
∣∣∣{i1, . . . , in} ⊆ {1, . . . , d}})
We aggregate this metric over all possible values of n, i.e. all possi-
ble numbers of specified dimensions. This aggregate information complexity
metric is:
uˆG =
d∑
n=0
uG(n) =
d∑
n=0
G(U(n))
We consider uˆG to be a measure of the overall information complexity of a
classification task.
2.3. Comparison to Boolean Complexity and GIST
To better understand the four metrics considered here—uˆmin, uˆmean, Boolean
complexity, and GIST—we compare how they evaluate SHJ Type II. SHJ
10
Type II is depicted in Table 1, where the stimuli are depicted as three-
dimensional binary vectors. As can be seen in this table, the ‘rule’ which
defines Type II is, if the first two dimensions match, then it is in category A;
if they do not, then it is in category B. This implies that the third dimension
has no effect on the categorization.
First, let us consider the Boolean complexity representation of this cat-
egorization. Boolean complexity begins with a maximally verbose logical
description of the elements of A, reduces the statement, and measures its
length. The notation used by Feldman (and Boole) is the following: we let
a, b, and c represent the claims “The first digit is 1,” “the second digit is
1,” and “the third digit is 1,” respectively. Then ab represents the claim “a
AND b,” a + b represents the claim “a OR b,” and a′ represents the claim
“not a.” Given this notation, the most verbose description of the elements
of A in SHJ Type II is: abc + abc′ + a′b′c + a′b′c′. The most compact repre-
sentation is ab + a′b′, which, translated back into verbal claims, is “the first
and second digits are both one or the first and second digits are both zero,”
which the reader can confirm corresponds to the fundamental rule describing
Type II above. Feldman’s Boolean complexity in this case involves simply
counting the ‘literals’ (i.e. claims a, b, or c) that appear in the most compact
representation. In the most compact representation, a appears twice and b
appears twice for a total of four literals, so the Boolean complexity of SHJ
Type II is 4.
Second, let us consider how GIST evaluates this categorization. GIST
considers ‘invariants’ based on ignoring or ‘binding’ dimensions one by one.
First, GIST constructs what Vigo calls a “structural manifold,” in which
it calculates the proportion of stimuli in A are invariants when a particular
dimension is ‘bound.’ Consider binding the third dimension. When the third
dimension is bound (ignored) every stimulus in category A is an invariant, so
the proportion associated with the third dimension is 1. By contrast, binding
either of the first two dimensions produces no invariants, to the proportion
associated with those dimensions are zero. Therefore the structural manifold
for SHJ Type II is (0, 0, 1). (In general, these proportions can lie between
zero and one.) The manifold (0, 0, 1) indicates that the first two dimensions
are the most useful to observe to categorize the object (i.e. ‘contain the
most information,’) while the third is the least useful. GIST transforms the
structural manifold into a single metric by taking the square root of the sum
of squared entries, and calling the resulting value Φ̂, which can be considered
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the value of the GIST metric.3 In this case, Φ̂ (SHJ II) =
√
02 + 02 + 12 = 1.
Third and finally, let us consider our information complexity metrics uˆmin
and uˆmean. As described above, they are identical but for aggregation at the
dimension level; accordingly, we are able to consider both at the same time.
The metric is constructed at each dimension level d from zero to three (in this
case), where d denotes the number of dimensions which are fixed. Consider
d = 1. If one dimension is known to be (say) zero, what is the probability that
a particular stimulus is in (say) category A? The corresponding probabilities
are (.5, .5, .5); that is, there are as many category A stimuli with a zero as the
first entry as category B stimuli, and so on. This corresponds to maximal
uncertainty in each case. Therefore the vector of uncertainties at dimension
level d = 1 is (1, 1, 1). This vector of uncertainties is called U(1) in the
notation above.4 Now consider d = 2. If two dimensions are known, what is
the uncertainty about the stimulus category A? First, consider the first two
dimensions. When the first two dimensions are known, then the category
is known with certainty. That implies that the uncertainty associated with
the first two dimensions is zero. Now consider the case when the first and
third dimension are known. In this case, the category is completely unknown
(there as many stimuli with first and third dimensions equalling, for example,
(0, 0), in the category A as B) and so uncertainty is maximized at 1. This
same argument applies when the second and third dimensions are known
(uncertainty is maximized). Therefore, the vector of uncertainties associated
with d = 2 is U(2) = (0, 1, 1). Having considered the non-trivial cases
of d = 1 and d = 2, let us now consider the trivial cases. Consider d = 3.
Uncertainty is minimized when all dimensions are observed, so the associated
uncertainty ‘vector’ is U(3) = (0). (Why does this vector have one entry?
Because there is only one way to divide the stimuli into subsets where all
dimensions are observed: one subset for each stimulus.) Finally, consider
d = 0. Clearly, uncertainty is maximized when no dimensions are observed,
so the uncertainty ‘vector’ U(0) = (1). (This vector has one entry because
there is only one way to divide the stimuli into subsets there no dimensions
3This is not precisely correct. In fact, Φ̂ is then transformed so that smaller Φ̂ cor-
responds to larger values and a functional form is applied which affects the magnitude.
However, since the reversed order of Φ̂ is preserved, the value of Φ̂ captures the essence of
GIST.
4Uncertainty is equal to the J associated with category A plus the J associated with
category B; so J(.5) + J(.5) = 2 · (−.5) · log2 .5 = 2 · (−.5) · (−1) = 1.
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are observed: all stimuli are in one subset.)
Now we apply the aggregation method, which reveals the difference be-
tween the version of the metric which reveals the paradigm-specific order and
the one which yields the general order. The mean aggregator assumes that
at each dimension level d, the ‘best’ way to divide up the stimuli cannot be
chosen. So the mean aggregator yields mean(1, 1, 1) for d = 1, which is 1, and
mean(0, 1, 1) for d = 2, which is .67; and obviously also selects mean(1) = 1
for d = 0 and mean(0) = 0 for d = 3. Therefore uˆmean = 1+1+.67+0 = 2.67.
By contrast, the min aggregator assumes that the ‘best’ way to divide up
the stimuli at each dimension level can be chosen. So the min aggregator
yields min(1, 1, 1) = 1 for d = 1 (no difference between min and mean) and
min(0, 1, 1) = 0 for d = 2, compared to mean(0, 1, 1) = .67 for the mean
aggregator. This obviously corresponds to the idea that the ‘best’ way to
break up the stimuli at the d = 2 level is to divide up the stimulus space by
considering the first two dimensions instead of any other pairing, and there is
where the value of the min aggregator emerges. So uˆmin = 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 2.
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In an important way, GIST can be thought of as a method which is in
two ways the ‘opposite’ of the information complexity metric. GIST looks for
stimuli which become identical when dimensions are ignored. By contrast,
in our information complexity metric, we fix the value of a dimension—
which is the ‘opposite’ of ignoring that dimension—and look for remaining
variation in objects, which is the ‘opposite’ of looking for invariants. This
cannot be taken too far, however: though “twice opposite” could mean “the
same,” GIST and information complexity are certainly not the same. The
comparison of the uncertainty vectors and the structural manifolds above
reveals that they are different. Part of the distinction is that while GIST
searches for ‘invariants,’ it makes no distinction among the non-invariants
about their degree of variance, while our metric does.
The information complexity metric has a min versus mean operator which
naturally captures the paradigm-specific and general orders and settings.
Might this approach—replacing min with mean—be usefully applied to Boolean
complexity and GIST to yield a prediction for the general order? Boolean
complexity is rooted in finding the minimally complicated definition of a
category, and counting its complexity: applying the logic of replacing min
with mean would suggest finding all ways to express a category and taking
5These values also appear in Table 3 (for uˆmin) and Table 4 (for uˆmean).
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the mean complexity of those expressions. This is plausibly well-defined, in
that the Boolean complexity starts with a maximally redundant list of the
elements of a category and then reduces redundant elements: perhaps the
complexity values at each step could be averaged. However, as this relies
on heuristics to find the minimum value, the mean value of the path to the
the minimum would presumably be even more sensitive to the details of the
heuristics chosen. On the other hand, there is no natural analog to extend
GIST to the general order/setting using this approach. GIST relies on the
search for invariants while ignoring dimensions, and the notion of minimiza-
tion doesn’t appear play any role, so there is no opportunity to even consider
the replacement of min with mean to broaden its application.
3. Results
In this section, we consider the application of the metric to different
classification learning tasks.
In Subsection 3.1, we apply the metric to the SHJ tasks. We consider both
the paradigm-specific and general order contexts. This involves comparison
to human data collected by Nosofsky et al. (1994) for the paradigm-specific
context and Nosofsky & Palmeri (1996) for the general context. In Subsection
3.2, we apply the metric to a larger range of tasks beyond SHJ. This involves
comparison to human data collected by Vigo (2013). These data cover more
classification learning tasks, but only in the paradigm-specific context.6 We
compare the performance of the information complexity metric to Feldman’s
Boolean complexity (Feldman, 2000) and Vigo’s GIST (Vigo, 2013).
In both of these task applications, the comparison to human data takes
two forms: a qualitative comparison, in which the ordering of difficulty pre-
dicted by the relevant version of our metric is compared to the difficulty
ordering observed in the human data; and a quantitative comparison, in
which values of the relevant metric are used to predict human classification
error rates. Both kinds of comparisons are important in this literature and
date back to the original SHJ analysis (Shepard et al., 1961).
6Therefore in this section we predict the outcome of future experiments: namely, these
classification learning tasks performed in the general context.
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Dim. Category (A or B)
Values By SHJ Type (I − V I)
1 2 3 I II III IV V V I
0 0 0 A A A A A A
0 0 1 A A A A A B
0 1 0 A B A A A B
0 1 1 A B B B B A
1 0 0 B B B A B B
1 0 1 B B A B B A
1 1 0 B A B B B A
1 1 1 B A B B A B
Paradigm-Specific Order: I < II ≤ III , IV , V < V I
General Order: I < IV < III < V < II < V I
Table 2: The six mappings of three-digit binary strings to categories, Type I-VI.
3.1. SHJ Tasks: Paradigm-specific versus General Orders
Consider the application to the SHJ tasks. Table 2 depicts the definitions
of SHJ tasks I through V I as well as the paradigm-specific and general
orders. In Subsection 2.2, we discussed two metrics, uˆmin and uˆmean, and
mentioned that uˆmin empirically predicts the paradigm-specific order and
uˆmean empirically predicts the general order.
Qualitative Comparison. Table 3 gives the outcome of umin metrics calcu-
lated for each SHJ task. Because the SHJ stimuli have three dimensions, the
first four rows give the intermediate metric values umin(0) through umin(3),
followed by the aggregate information complexity metric uˆmin. uˆmin correctly
predicts the paradigm-specific order. To understand the application to SHJ,
consider umin(1) and umin(2). umin(1) finds I < III, IV, V < II, V I and
umin(2) finds I, II < III, IV, V < V I. Neither is the full paradigm-specific
order: they must be summed into uˆmin in order to recover the paradigm-
specific order. Why the sum? Each rule extracts some amount of information,
so the sum measures total information. Interestingly, all of the hallmarks of
the SHJ paradigm-specific ordering are preserved in each case—except for
Type II. This potentially provides an account of individual differences that
were observed in Kurtz et al. (2013), which showed a bimodal distribution
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SHJ Types Order
I II III IV V V I
umin(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 I = II = III =
? IV =? V = V I
umin(1) 0 1 0.81 0.81 0.81 1 I <
? III =? IV =? V < II = V I
umin(2) 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 I = II <
? III =? IV =? V <? V I
umin(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 I = II = III =
? IV =? V = V I
uˆmin 1 2 2.31 2.31 2.31 3 I <
? II <? III =? IV =? V <? V I
Table 3: The information complexity metric umin calculated for the SHJ classification
learning problems. The last line contains the aggregate metric and is the sum of the
previous lines. “?” indicates that this relationship matches the paradigm-specific order.
SHJ Types Order
I II III IV V V I
umean(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 I = IV = III = V = II = V I
umean(1) 0.67 1.00 0.87 0.81 0.94 1.00 I <
? IV <? III <? V <? II = V I
umean(2) 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.67 1.00 I <
? IV = III <? V = II <? V I
umean(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 I = IV = III = V = II = V I
uˆmean 2.00 2.67 2.37 2.31 2.60 3.00 I <
? IV <? III <? V <? II <? V I
Table 4: The information complexity metric umean calculated on the SHJ classification
learning problems. The last line contains the aggregate metric and is the sum of the
previous lines. “?” indicates that this relationship matches the general order.
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in Type II learning.7 That is, some subjects learn Type II very fast and
some learn it quite slow, and aggregate results essentially reflect the weight-
ing of the two types of learners in a sample. It may be the case that subjects
who are, implicitly or explicitly, constructing rules that focus on fixing one
dimension are the ones who learn Type II slowly, but those who are con-
structing rules that focus on fixing two dimensions are the ones who learn
it quickly. It also might be that agents who focus on one rule over the
other weight that information more heavily: this suggests that a metric like
αumin(1) + (1− α)umin(2) for α ∈ [0, 1] which vary across people could ac-
count for individual performance.
The mean information complexity metric also displays this characteris-
tic, that no single level fully captures the general order. Consider umean(1)
and umean(2) from Table 4. umean(1) finds II = V I and and umean(2) finds
IV = III and V = II. Neither metric alone fully captures human learning
difficulty in the general order: the general order is only recovered by summing
to uˆmean.
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Figure 1: Quantitative Comparison: uˆmin and uˆmean vs. Human Data (Nosofsky et. al ’94
and Nosofsky & Palmeri ’96).
7Kurtz et al. (2013) found that participants given task instructions to look for rules dur-
ing learning were likely to show a Type II advantage—unlike those given neutral instruc-
tions. We speculate that performance variation driven by task context or by individual
differences may reflect processing of a limited or restricted nature.
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Quantitative Comparison. Now, we consider the quantitative fit of the
information complexity metric to two established data sets: data gathered by
Nosofsky et al. (1994) in the paradigm-specific setting and data gathered by
Nosofsky & Palmeri (1996) in the general setting. We average the probability
of error across the 25 blocks of data for each SHJ Type, and then calculate the
coefficient of determination (R2) between the relevant information complexity
metric and the average probability of error. We find that the R2 between
the paradigm-specific human data and uˆmin is .829 and the R
2 between the
general human data and uˆmean is 0.970. The scatterplots with best-fit lines
can be seen in Figure 1.
3.2. Beyond SHJ
Now we consider the application of the information complexity metric be-
yond the SHJ category structures. In Feldman (2000, 2003), he identified the
extended catalog of logical category structures beyond SHJ. In the notation
he introduced, a set of tasks D[P ] indicates objects of D dimensions with P
objects in category A. In this notation, the tasks we consider here are: 2[1],
2[2], 3[1], 3[2], 3[3], 3[4] (SHJ), 4[1], 4[2], 4[3] and 4[4]. We find the quan-
titative R2 fit and qualitative ordering fit to human data collected by Vigo
(2013). We compare this fit against other metrics: Vigo’s GIST (Vigo, 2013)
and Feldman’s Boolean complexity (Feldman, 2000). Vigo (2013) represents
an important advance in the literature on complexity-based accounts of cat-
egory learning: (1) the GIST account is an alternative to Boolean algebraic
rules based on the core principle of deriving complexity from the degree of
categorical invariance to perturbing transformations; (2) a wide set of human
learning data on logical category structures are provided using an improved
methodology over what was previously available in this domain;8 and (3)
impressive fits are demonstrated between the two.
Table 5 shows the values of uˆmin and uˆmean for the tasks 2[1], 2[2], 3[1],
3[2], 3[3], 3[4] (SHJ), 4[1], 4[2], 4[3] and 4[4]. The first column, A, explicitly
lists the elements of a representative A set, when the category in question
8Vigo’s description of his improved methodology over Feldman (2000), which we find
compelling, describes four improvements: the same time for subjects to learn stimuli across
tasks, regardless of dimensionality; sampling from all possible structures consistent with a
particular D[P ] value, instead of a subset; stimuli that are less abstract (images of flasks
instead of ‘amoeba’); and assigning stimuli to subjects in a way that all experiments took
roughly the same time, which would reduce errors due to subject fatigue.
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2[1]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{00} 1.31 1.31
2[2]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{00, 01} 1. 1.5
{00, 11} 2. 2.
3[1]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{000} 1.2 1.2
3[2]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{000, 001} 1.31 1.74
{000, 011} 1.81 2.02
{000, 111} 2.12 2.12
3[3]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{000, 001, 010} 1.61 2.11
{000, 001, 110} 2.11 2.44
{000, 011, 101} 2.61 2.61
3[4]
SHJ Type: A uˆmin uˆmean
I: {000, 001, 010, 011} 1. 2.
II: {000, 001, 110, 111} 2. 2.67
III: {000, 001, 010, 101} 2.31 2.37
IV: {000, 001, 010, 100} 2.31 2.31
V: {000, 001, 010, 111} 2.31 2.60
VI: {000, 011, 101, 110} 3. 3.
4[1]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{0000} 0.93 0.93
4[2]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{0000, 0001} 1.2 1.5
{0000, 0011} 1.45 1.64
{0000, 0111} 1.61 1.71
{0000, 1111} 1.74 1.74
4[3]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{0000, 0001, 0010} 1.5 1.97
{0000, 0001, 0110} 1.75 2.14
{0000, 0001, 1110} 1.95 2.22
{0000, 0011, 0101} 2.01 2.24
{0000, 0011, 1100} 2.21 2.32
{0000, 0011, 1101} 2.21 2.34
4[4]
A uˆmin uˆmean
{0000, 0001, 0010, 0011} 1.31 2.19
{0000, 0001, 0010, 0100} 1.97 2.34
{0000, 0001, 0010, 0101} 1.97 2.37
{0000, 0001, 0010, 0111} 1.97 2.5
{0000, 0001, 0010, 1100} 2.22 2.55
{0000, 0001, 0010, 1101} 2.22 2.56
{0000, 0001, 0010, 1111} 2.22 2.61
{0000, 0001, 0110, 0111} 1.81 2.52
{0000, 0001, 0110, 1010} 2.47 2.67
{0000, 0001, 0110, 1011} 2.47 2.71
{0000, 0001, 0110, 1110} 2.31 2.6
{0000, 0001, 0110, 1111} 2.31 2.73
{0000, 0001, 1110, 1111} 2.12 2.66
{0000, 0011, 0101, 0110} 2.31 2.7
{0000, 0011, 0101, 1001} 2.72 2.72
{0000, 0011, 0101, 1010} 2.72 2.77
{0000, 0011, 0101, 1110} 2.72 2.84
{0000, 0011, 1100, 1111} 2.62 2.83
{0000, 0011, 1101, 1110} 2.62 2.88
Table 5: Results of the Information Complexity Metric uˆ
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is viewed in “up parity;” i.e. when category A has fewer elements than its
complementary category B. For example, 3[4], the SHJ tasks, lists the first
set A as {000, 001, 010, 011}, which is the familiar Type I problem, in which
the first dimension is sufficient to determine whether a particular stimulus is
in category A. (Note that, due to symmetry, there is no distinction between
up and down parity in the SHJ tasks.) For the convenience of the reader, in
Table 5 the tasks in each category structure are listed in the same order that
they appear elsewhere (Feldman, 2000, 2003; Vigo, 2013).
uˆmin GISTM BoolC
3[2] 1 .866 1
3[3] 1 1 1
3[4] (SHJ) .941 .812 .941
4[2] .8 1 .8
4[3] .986 .926 .986
4[4] .910 .860 .789
Table 6: Spearman ρ: Information Complexity vs. GIST vs. Boolean Complexity. The
value indicates correlation in orders between the metric and human data.
Qualitative Comparison. First, we consider the relative difficulty or-
derings implied by Feldman’s Boolean complexity (Feldman, 2003), Vigo’s
GISTM (Vigo, 2013), and uˆmin, and compare them to the orderings found
in Vigo’s data.9 The data in question are from the 84 structures tested
Vigo’s Experiment 1, what Vigo refers to as VEXPRO-84 in his text.10 In
9The orderings implied by Vigo’s GISTM metric are extrapolated from the values of
Φˆ given in Vigo (2013) Table 1. Since GISTM is the ‘core model’ of Vigo’s approach, we
believe that the incorporation of GISTM orderings are sufficient for this analysis.
10We would like to thank Dr. Vigo for making these data available to us for this analysis.
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this experiment, human adult learners (Ohio University undergraduates) are
presented with stimuli with separable dimensions (images of flasks which var-
ied in color, size, shape, and neck width). Since this experiment is in the
paradigm-specific setting, uˆmin is our preferred metric.
The rank correlations, also called Spearman ρ, between the data and
the available metrics are depicted in Table 6. They provide a quantitative
metric to measure ordering accuracy. As can be seen, uˆmin provides the equal
or better rank correlation for each category structures except for 4[2], where
GISTM provides the best rank correlation. The different category structures
are discussed in detail below.
There is only one non-trivial case for two dimensions, which is 2[2]. For
these category structures, Boolean complexity, GISTM, and uˆmin orderings
match, but no human data are available.
There are three non-trivial cases for three dimensions, and differences
across metrics and the human data are observed. For 3[2], Boolean complex-
ity and uˆmin orderings match each other and also match the order observed
in the data: {000, 001} < {000, 011} < {000, 111}. However, the GISTM
predicts that {000, 001} and {000, 111} are of equal difficulty, which is not
observed in the data. As can be seen in Table 6, this causes GISTM to have
a lower rank correlation with the human data. For 3[3], Boolean complex-
ity, GISTM, uˆmin, and the observed data orderings all match, and therefore
perfect rank correlations are observed in Table 6.
3[4] are the SHJ tasks, discussed above, where the Boolean complexity
ordering matches the uˆmin ordering. GISTM ordering is similar to Boolean
complexity and uˆmin ordering, except that III = IV < V instead of III =
IV = V . Note that the correlations in Table 6 are not 1 because there are
actually slight differences in the human data between III, IV , and V , and
rank order is strict with regards to those slight differences. And GISTM’s
prediction over those three items does run contrary to the small human vari-
ation. (Also, as noted above, neither GISTM nor Boolean complexity predict
the general order, which we predict with uˆmean. See Section 3.1).
There are also three non-trivial cases for four dimensions that we consider
here. For 4[2], Boolean complexity and uˆmin match each other:
{0000, 0001} < {0000, 0011} < {0000, 0111} < {0000, 1111}
In the data, we observe a reversal of the last two categories, namely that
{0000, 1111} < {0000, 0111}. GISTM predicts that {0000, 0111} and {0000, 1111}
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are of equal difficulty. This causes GISTM to have a higher rank correlation
for 4[2], as observed in Table 6.
For 4[3], Boolean complexity and uˆmin orderings match each other: there
is a strict ordering over the first five tasks, and the fifth and sixth tasks are
equally difficult. This very nearly matches the human data: in the human
data three is a strict order over all items, including the last two (the sixth
is more difficult than the fifth.) GISTM predicts many ties between items:
GISTM predicts the second and third items are of equal difficulty, and pre-
dicts that the fourth, fifth, and sixth items are of equal difficulty. This leads
GISTM to have a lower rank correlation than does uˆmin.
Finally, we consider the most complicated set of category structures, 4[4].
All orderings differ from each other, and all differ from the data. Boolean
complexity and uˆmin match fairly well, although uˆmin finds two pairs to be
identical that Boolean complexity differentiates. uˆmin also finds that the 11
th
item, {0000, 0001, 0110, 1110}, is moderately difficult, consistent with the
human data, while Boolean complexity finds it fairly easy. The combination
of these factors cause Boolean complexity to have a relatively low ρ value.
GISTM declares many cases to be identical which other metrics differentiate
(two pairs of identical tasks, two triples of identical tasks, and one group
of six identical tasks.) This also lowers GISTM’s match to human rankings
relative to uˆmin.
Quantitative Comparison. Table 7 depicts the coefficient of determination
(R2) of the information complexity metrics, Vigo’s metrics of GIST-SE and
GIST-M, and Feldman’s Boolean complexity against Vigo’s human data. The
GISTM-SE and GISTM R2 values depicted here are from Vigo’s Figure 7,
averaged over up and down parity (Vigo, 2013).11 The Boolean complexityR2
values are calculated by the authors using the values for Boolean complexity
given in Feldman (2003).
uˆmin should provide a better fit to these data than uˆmean. We find this to
be the case in 3[3], 3[4] (previously noted), 4[3], and 4[4], which is consistent
with this hypothesis. Before discussing the two exceptions, 3[2] and 4[2],
below, we wish to note that this table also yields a prediction for future ex-
11We do this because our metric does not differentiate between up and down parity,
because it is symmetric with regards to included and excluded categories. For the same
reason, we collapse the behavioral data collected by Vigo over parity as well. It is worth
noting that the up-down parity differences are external to the core ordering effects.
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uˆmin uˆmean GISTM-SE GISTM BoolC
3[2] 0.994 0.999 0.950 0.910 0.995
3[3] 0.930 0.805 0.890 0.925 0.930
3[4] 0.877 0.519 1.000 0.920 0.965
4[2] 0.765 0.873 0.915 0.835 0.912
4[3] 0.891 0.866 0.945 0.945 0.978
4[4] 0.915 0.913 0.850 0.845 0.686
Table 7: Coefficient of Determination R2: Information Complexity vs. GIST vs. BoolC.
Because this is a paradigm-specific setting, uˆmin is the preferred information complexity
metric (indicated in bold).
periments: we predict that experiments 3[3], 4[3], and 4[4] performed in the
general setting—i.e. with integral dimensions, with children or monkeys as
subjects, or when categorization difficulty is extrapolated from errors in iden-
tification learning—should be better explained by uˆmean than uˆmin. (Please
see Table 5 for those values).
For 3[2] and 4[2], we find uˆmean provides a better fit than uˆmin. The
explanation we find most likely is illuminating. The explanation that uˆmin
ought to be a better fit than uˆmean requires that subjects either implicitly or
explicitly search for dimensions that explain the categorization best. In 3[2],
category A is only two objects from 23 = 8 total; and in 4[2], category A is
only two objects from 24 = 16 total. No matter how those two stimuli are
distributed in the stimulus space, there is hardly any meaningful structure
of subdimensions. This might be why our uˆmin metric does not perform
well in this case. That is, subjects are not searching for dimension-based
definitions of A, instead they may be memorizing the elements of A. If this
explanation is correct, it would also arise in any other D[P ] case where D
is large while P is small. Moreover, if this explanation is correct, we would
expect this effect to be more pronounced for 4[2] over 3[2] (because the set
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A is smaller relative to the total number of objects); and indeed, 4[2] shows
a more distinct advantage of uˆmean over uˆmin than does 3[2], where the uˆmean
advantage is slight.
Consider the fit of the information complexity metrics relative to GISTM
and GISTM-SE, and then to Boolean complexity, also depicted in Table
7. uˆmin is a better fit than the better of GISTM-SE and GISTM in the
cases of 3[2], 3[3], and 4[4]; the reverse holds for 3[4], 4[2], and 4[3]. From
this perspective, the metrics are of comparable quantitative fit. However, it
should be noted that the GIST metrics involve a free parameter (k) fitted to
data separately for each set of category structures, which a degree of freedom
the information complexity metric does not have. uˆmin is a comparable fit to
Boolean complexity in 3[2] and 3[3],12 a worse fit in 3[4], 4[2], and 4[3], and
a substantially better fit in 4[4]. So the quantitative fit comparison here is
mixed.
4. Conclusions
The existing complexity metric literature concludes that “human concep-
tual difficulty reflects intrinsic mathematical complexity[.]”(Feldman, 2000)
Our finding strengthens and deepens this fundamental result. We find that
human conceptual difficulty reflects information complexity, where informa-
tion complexity, based on Shannon entropy, is a concept based on uncertainty
remaining as dimensions or sets of dimensions are specified. This approach
has the advantage of being able to predict human learning whether in the
paradigm-specific setting—in which adult learners are shown objects with
separable dimensions—or in the general setting—in which dimensions are in-
tegral, in which learners are children or monkeys, or if errors are extrapolated
from identification learning. Importantly, the second setting has never before
been predicted by any mathematical complexity approach. Moreover, this
approach explains these two domains in a way that reveals a possibly deep
connection: when dimensions are separable, human learners are able to iden-
tify the dimension or set of dimensions that yield the minimum uncertainty,
and exploit that; and when learners do not or cannot differentiate dimen-
sions, then average uncertainty best predicts human learning. Finally, our
12Although uˆmean is a better fit than Boolean complexity for 3[2]. See discussion above
on that point.
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metric makes predictions about the difficulty ordering for classification learn-
ing experiments beyond SHJ in the general setting. As experiments about
general-setting learning beyond SHJ accumulate, we will learn whether and
how effectively this measure of mathematical complexity can predict learning
behavior.
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